Passkeys don't encrypt
Passkeys prove who you are with signatures. To encrypt data you need a symmetric secret, which only the PRF extension provides.
webauthn-prf-zktv is an open-source TypeScript library that wraps a vault key under a secret derived from a passkey (the WebAuthn PRF extension) or under a scrypt-stretched master password, so that a dump of everything stored can never reconstruct the key. It was extracted from TrustVault and is the reference implementation for a published research preprint.
Source: README ↗
Passkeys prove who you are with signatures. To encrypt data you need a symmetric secret, which only the PRF extension provides.
Probe credentials, skipped origin checks or a passkey-only design that loses data when the passkey is deleted are common mistakes.
Teams re-implement the ceremony, key derivation and storage each time. A small, tested library and a written design make it reviewable.
Two independent paths derive a wrap key. Either one can unwrap the same 32-byte vault key; neither input is ever stored.
| Module | What it gives you |
|---|---|
webauthn-prf-zktv | wrapSecret / unwrapSecret for prf-v1 and pw-v1, HKDF and scrypt derivation, versioned JSON records, TrustVault migration, typed errors, zeroize |
/webauthn | Tri-state PRF detection without probe credentials, adaptive one- or two-ceremony enrollment, assertion with challenge, origin and counter checks, enrollVault / unlockVault |
/indexeddb | Vault, credential and meta stores; PRF and password wraps of one vault side by side; targeted and full wipes |
An attacker with every stored byte holds only ciphertext, salts, nonces and credential metadata. Recovering the key needs the PRF output or the password.
Keys are non-extractable, so injected script can misuse an unlocked key while the page is open but cannot copy it or unlock later sessions.
Synced passkeys often report a counter of 0. The library exposes backup flags so apps can apply their own risk policy.
| Platform | PRF | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Chrome / Edge | Yes | PRF evaluated during registration from Chrome 147, so enrollment is a single ceremony |
| Safari | Yes | macOS 15+ and iOS 18+ via iCloud Keychain |
| Firefox | Yes | 147/148 and later |
| Android (Credential Manager) | Yes | Robust |
| Windows Hello | Yes | Windows 11 25H2+ (WebAuthn API v8) |
| Android WebView / Capacitor | No | PRF does not pass through to Credential Manager; use the password scheme |
Source: library README, 2026.
Published on figshare on 6 July 2026 under CC BY 4.0.
Pinto, Ian (2026). WebAuthn PRF-Based Vault Key Wrapping and Zero-Knowledge PWA Storage Architecture. figshare. Preprint. https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.32915411.v1
| Decision | Reason |
|---|---|
| No SimpleWebAuthn dependency | Native navigator.credentials calls with strict PRF validation keep the attack surface and bundle small. |
| No probe credentials | Capability detection uses getClientCapabilities(); enrollment hard-verifies PRF only when support is unknown. |
| Password wrap is mandatory in the docs | A deleted passkey must never mean data loss. |
| Known-answer interop vectors | Lets other languages implement the same format and check their output byte for byte. |
| Symmetric-only wrap path | No asymmetric secrecy dependency, so the design keeps a post-quantum margin. |
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Last public activity 7 July 2026 · checked 5 November 2026
webauthn-prf-zktv is an MIT-licensed TypeScript library by Ian Pinto that wraps a vault key under a WebAuthn PRF output (a secret derived from a passkey after biometric or PIN verification) or under a master password stretched with scrypt. A stored record dump alone can never reconstruct the vault key. Version 0.2.0 is published on npm.
The WebAuthn pseudo-random function (PRF) extension lets a web app ask a passkey authenticator for a high-entropy secret, computed in hardware with the CTAP2 hmac-secret feature after user verification. Because it is never stored, it can safely act as the root of a client-side encryption key.
Because tying encryption to a passkey alone is dangerous: deleting the passkey would destroy the data. The password wrap (pw-v1) is the safety net that makes PRF unlock (prf-v1) safe to deploy.
According to the library documentation: Chrome and Edge (with PRF evaluated during registration from Chrome 147), Safari on macOS 15+ and iOS 18+ via iCloud Keychain, Firefox 147 or 148 and later, Android Credential Manager, and Windows Hello on Windows 11 25H2+. PRF does not pass through Android WebView or Capacitor, where the password scheme is used.
Yes. "WebAuthn PRF-Based Vault Key Wrapping and Zero-Knowledge PWA Storage Architecture" by Ian Pinto was published as a preprint on figshare on 6 July 2026 under CC BY 4.0, DOI 10.6084/m9.figshare.32915411.v1.
The wrap path uses only symmetric primitives: AES-256-GCM, HKDF-SHA256 and scrypt. Grover's algorithm halves effective symmetric strength, which leaves about a 128-bit post-quantum margin for AES-256. WebAuthn signatures authenticate but never protect secrecy in this design.
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